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UNIFORM AVIATION LIABILITY ACT*
WILLIAM A. SCHNADERt
It is my purpose to present to you as briefly as possible the
point of view of the committees which prepared the three uniform
state laws, known respectivly as the Uniform Aviation Liability
Act, the Uniform Law of Airflight and the Uniform Air Jurisdic-
tion Act.
Before doing so, perhaps you will indulge me for a few
minutes while I give you the history of the preparation of these acts.
As you doubtless know, as early as 1922, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared and, with
the approval of the American Bar Association, recommended to
the states for adoption, the Uniform Aeronautics Act.
This act dealt with the following topics only: Sovereignty in
space, Ownership of space, Lawfulness of flight, Damage on land,
Collision of aircraft, Jurisdiction over crimes and torts, Jurisdic-
tion over contracts, Dangerous flying, and Hunting from an aircraft.
Section 3 of the Act provided that the ownership of the space
above the lands and waters of a State, is vested in the several owners
of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight provided in
Section 4.
Section 4 provided that flight by aircraft over the lands and
waters of a state is lawful unless at such a low altitude as to inter-
fere with the then existing use to which the land or the space over
the land is put by the owner or unless so conducted as to be immi-
nently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land be-
neath. Landing by an aircraft on the land of another without his
consent was declared to be unlawful except in the case of a forced
landing.
Section 5 imposed upon the owner of an aircraft absolute and
unlimited liability for injuries to persons or property on the land,-
that is for ground damage. This liability was declared to be re-
gardless of negligence on the part of the owner, but he was ex-
empted from liability if the injury was caused, in whole or in part,
by the negligence of the person or the owner or bailee of the prop-
erty injured.
* Address presented at the Eighth Annual Convention of the National Asso-
ciation of State Aviation Officials, October 13-15. 1938.
t Chairman, Committee on Uniform Aeronautical Code, National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Law.
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Section 6 provided that liability of owners of aircraft in case
of collision should be determined by the rules of law applicable to
torts on land.
Twenty-two states have adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act.
Since 1923, the American Law Institute has been engaged in
restating the common law of the United States. One of the sub-
jects of the restatement is "Torts." In Volume 1, pages 366-367,
the Restatement of Torts deals with intrusion by aircraft into air
space above property. These statements appear:
"e. An unprivileged intrusion in the space above the surface of the
earth, at whatever height above the surface, is a trespass.
"f. A temporary invasion of the air space by aircraft, for the purpose
of travel through it or other legitimate purpose, if done in a reasonable
manner, and at such a height as is in conformity with legislative require-
ments and does not interfere unreasonably with the possessor's enjoyment
of the surface of the earth and the air space above it, is privileged.
"g. Where a person is carefully and skilfully operating an aircraft in a
place where he may lawfully so operate it and against his will and with-
out any culpability on his part the aircraft, its cargo or any part thereof,
or the operator himself, or any person traveling therein, invades the air space
above premises in the possession of another at an unreasonably low altitude,
or comes to earth upon the surface thereof, the actor is under no liability
if no harm results to the land or to the possessor or to anything or third
person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest. On
the other hand, if the entry causes such a harm the actor is subject to lia-
bility therefor even though he has acted with due care, since at the present
time the operation of aircraft is an extra-hazardous activity."
At page 460 of the same volume appears Paragraph 194, deal-
ing with "Travel Through Airspace." It is as follows:
"An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space in the pos-
session of another, by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is privileged
if the flight is conducted
"(a) for the purpose of travel through the air space or for any other
legitimate purpose,
"(b) in a reasonable manner,
"(c) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the pos-
sessor's enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air space
above it, and
"(d) in conformity with such regulations of the State and federal aero-
nautical authorities as are in force in the particular State."
Although the Restatement of Torts was finally published in
1934, it was in course of preparation for the preceding ten years.
During this period, various tentative drafts were circulated for
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discussion and there was a great deal of controversy over the para-
graphs to which I have referred.
Possibly this controversy led to the inauguration, about 1928
of a movement to have the American Bar Association prepare a
Uniform Aeronautical Code.
The plan to prepare such a Code was initiated by the Bar Asso-
ciation's Committee on Aeronautical Law of which your counsel,
Mr. Logan, was a member,-and a very useful member,-for a
number of years.
Under the Constitution of the American Bar Association, all
proposed state legislation must be referred to the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Accordingly, the proposal to prepare a Uniform Aeronautical
Code became current business of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws shortly after the Bar Association Committee had in-
augurated the movement to prepare a State Aeronautical Code.
For several years, the Bar Association Committee and the Com-
mittee of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws assigned to the
task of dealing with the subject, were not at all in harmony.
However, in one respect, there was no disagreement, namely,
that two separate divisions of a Uniform Aeronautical Code should
be known as the Uniform Air Licensing Act and the Uniform Air-
ports Act. Later on the name of the former act was changed to
the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act. Beginning in 1935, the
American Bar Association Committee on Aeronautical Law and the
Conference Committee on Uniform Aeronautical Code joined forces
in their work on an Aeronautical Code. From that year until this
year, I was chairman of both committees and neither committee
ever held a meeting to discuss the proposed code, unless the mem-
bers of the other were invited to be present. And, according to my
best recollection, no meeting was ever held which was not attended
by a quorum of each committee.
In 1935, the work on the Uniform Airports Act and on the
Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act was completed. In the last
stages of this work, we received great assistance from your or-
ganization through Professor'Fagg. I think it is fair to say that
the Airports Act and the Regulatory Act represented the combined
judgment of your organization, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the Committee on Aero-
nautical Law of the American Bar Association.
The remaining chapters of the Code involved much more seri-
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ous problems than those which have been solved in the Airports
Act and the Regulatory Act.
In the first place, there was great dissatisfaction among those
interested in aviation, in the restatement of the common law by the
American Law Institute as I have given it to you.
The restatement dealt only with the subjects of ground damage
and the lawfulness of flight over another's land.
As far as concerned passenger liability, the restatement was
silent.
But the courts have, from the beginning, differed widely as to
the rules of law to be applied in suits between passengers and
operators of aircraft.
There are decisions holding that the rules to be applied in air
cases are the same as in any others.
Under these decisions, the passenger, or in the case of his
death, those who have the right to sue for damages for his death,
have the burden of proving negligence on the part of the carrier,
and failing such proof, they cannot recover.
Other courts have decided that in aircraft accident cases, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Under this rule, the
very happening of the accident imputes negligence, and the burden
is on the defendant to show the absence of negligence.
Intermediately, there are decisions which do not consistently
apply either .of the two rules I have mentioned.
Under any of these rules, if the plaintiff meets his burden of
proof, the amount of his recovery is unlimited. Damages are as-
sessable by a jury; and the amount at which a jury may appraise
an injury or a death is always unpredictable.
We may summarize the situation which confronted u3
as follows:
1. Liability for Ground Damage: Under both the common
law as restated by the American Law Institute and the Uniform
Aeronautics Act enacted by 22 states, there is absolute and unlimited
liability;
2. Passenger Liability: There is an irrreconcilable conflict of
view as to the rules of law which should be applied. Liability is
unlimited if negligence is either proved or presumed;
3. Collision: The same rules apply as in the case of collision
between other types of craft;
4. Lawfulness of Flight: Under the common law, as restated
by the American Law Institute, flight over another's land is a
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trespass unless privileged. A flight is privileged only under very
restricted circumstances.
Incidentally, in 1936 the American Law Institute agreed to
cooperate with the Bar Association and the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in completing the Uniform Aeronautical Code.
Although the Institute was satisfied that it has correctly stated the
common law relating to lawfulness of flight, it felt that the com-
mon law was too harsh and that it should be modified by statute.
Accordingly, from 1936 to the completion of our work, the
American Bar Association, the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
collaborated in the preparation of the drafts I am discussing.
In order to attack the problem of preparing a statute relating
to liability for ground damage and passenger liability, it was neces-
sary to obtain the greatest possible amount of practical information
regarding the number of accidents, the extent to which the causes
of accidents can be determined, the amount of insurance which is
presently carried by operators of aircraft, insurance rates, and the
results of certain suggested measures upon aviation and aviation
insurance rates.
Conferences were held in New York and Chicago to which
aviation insurance underwriters, representatives of the commercial
air lines and others were invited.
We also sought and obtained information from other sources.
As a result of all of the information obtainable, I believe that
the following statement fairly represents the situation as it exists:
I. As TO LIABILITY FOR GROUND DAMAGE
(a) From the Standpoint of the Public: The person or the
owner of property on the ground is absolutely helpless to avoid
damage by aircraft. Crashes, when they come, are unheralded and
unpredictable. The situation is entirely different from any other
hazard to which persons and property are subjected. For example,
by keeping off the highways, personal injury by automobile can,
except in rare instances, be escaped, but there is no way to keep
either persons or property out of the zone of possible aircraft crash.
Accordingly, the feeling seems to be universal, (except among avi-
ators themselves), that for so-called ground damage operators of
aircraft must continue to be held liable regardless of negligence.
However, from the standpoint of the public, the abstract right
to recover an unlimited amount for this type of damage affords less
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actual protection than insurance in a limited amount. Therefore,
it would seem that the public would be afforded better protection,
practically, by holding operators of aircraft liable regardless of
negligence only within limits determined according to the weight
of the aircraft or its speed or its horsepower or some other definite
factor, provided that each operator be required to carry insurance
to the extent to which his liability is limited.
It is generally agreed that it would be impossible under our
federal and state constitutions to compel a property owner or a
person on the ground to accept in full satisfaction of a claim for
injury inflicted by aircraft a limited sum, if the injured party can
prove that the accident was due to the Operator's negligence. For
this reason it was felt necessary to give to the injured party alterna-
tive rights of recovery. First, he may recover a limited amount
without proving negligence, but, second, if he can prove negligence,
he may recover whatever damages he can prove. However, the
draft makes it perfectly plain that if the ground damage claimant
elects to seek unlimited recovery, he must assume completely the
burden of proving negligence without the aid of any presumption
whatever in his favor. No insurance is required against any lia-
bility except the limited liability regardless of negligence, which
the act imposes.
(b) From the Standpoint of the Operator of Aircraft: The
insurance requirements proposed in the draft are less than the
amount of insurance normally carried by commercial air lines. As-
cordingly, the insurance requirements can impose no serious hard-
ship there.
As both the common law and the statutory law in almost one-
half of the states impose unlimited absolute liability for ground
damage, the proposal that the new act impose limited absolute lia-
bility, favors all operators of aircraft.
The real pinch is the requirement that private fliers as well
as commercial air lines carry insurance against ground damage
within the limits specified in the act. We were given to understand
that the insurance rate for a policy required for a small aircraft
would cost in the neighborhood of $60 or $70 per annum. We
were also informed that there are a number of private fliers to
whom $60 or $70 per annum for insurance would be a burden.
We gave earnest consideration to this situation. We concluded
that any private flier who could not afford to pay $60 or $70 per
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annum for an insurance premium, ought not to be permitted to
endanger life and property by flying an aircraft.
Obviously, the statutory and common law imposition of un-
limited absolute liability upon all operators of aircraft for ground
damage affords no protection whatever against -harm at the hands
of a flier whose resources are so meager that he cannot afford a
small premium to protect him against claims, and claimants against
loss, resulting from contacts between his plane and objects on the
ground.
The committees were informed that the number of cases of
ground damage are relatively very, very few. This, however, is
small consolation for the owners of property or the relatives of per-
sons who are the victims of the few crashes which do inflict ground
damage.
We also learned that the number of private fliers who carry
insurance against ground liability is almost negligible. Certainly
if all fliers were compelled to carry this type of insurance, the rates
should be substantially reduced.
Opinions may differ as to the wisdom of the proposed pro-
visions, but there can be no just accusation that the committees
which prepared the acts did not consider all the factors and all the
arguments pertinent to the solution of the problem.
It is also an interesting fact that the principles which I have
been discussing were approved by the American Law Institute
after protracted debate by an almost unanimous vote, and, also after
protracted debate, by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
States Laws by a vote of more than a majority of the states repre-
sented, at its 1937 meeting.
II. As TO PASSENGER LIABILITY
(a) From the Public Standpoint: The question has been
asked, Why should operators of aircraft be singled out from all
other carriers of passengers as far as concerns the rules applicable
to liability for injury or death?
.The committees believed that there are two answers to this
question, of which the first is much the more important.
We had the valuable assistance, first as an unofficial consultant,
and latterly as a member of the Conference Committee, of Colonel
John H. Wigmore, formerly Dean of the Northwestern University
Law School. Colonel Wigmore had access to the files of the Bureau
of Air Commerce of the Federal Government.
N.A.S.A.O. PROCEEDINGS
After an exhaustive study of the files, Colonel' Wigmore re-
ported to us that in less than 20% of all air crashes would it be
-possible for the victims or their relatives to obtain provable evi-
dence of the cause of the crash. Differently stated, it would not be
possible for the plaintiffs in air accident cases to prove negligence
or to rebut evidence of care offered by the aircraft operators, in
one case out of five.
This fact alone would seem to warrant a rule of liability for
injury to or death of passengers, regardless of the operator's
negligence.
The second fact which would seem to justify a different rule
in air accident cases, is the relative number of fatalities resulting
from air travel as compared with other modes of travel.
The most recent figures released by the National Safety Coun-
cil show the relative number of lives lost for every billion passenger
miles traveled to have been (in 1936):
Trains, 1;
Automobiles, including busses, 45;
Scheduled aircraft, 101;
Non-scheduled aircraft, 1622.
From the public standpoint it seemed to the committees that
there was no occasion by statute to give special protection to the
person who rides in aircraft as a guest passenger. On the other
hand, we felt that aircraft which carry passengers for compensa-
tion,-and particularly, the non-commercial air lines,-ought to be
required to carry insurance in fixed amounts to assure passengers
or their families of a limited recovery for injury or death. If in
more than four cases out of five the cause of an air crash is not
susceptible of proof in court, it is a mere mockery to talk about the
burden of proof or in any other way to consider proof of negli-
gence as a factor which ought to be considered in determining
whether and in what amount compensation should be paid.
(b) From the Standpoint of Aviation: The committees were
informed that the commercial airlines now carry more insurance
than the proposed uniform act would require. At present there is
no limit to the amount in which they may be held liable for an
injury or death. Accordingly, their risks are speculative, at least
to a substantial degree. To require commercial airlines to carry
insurance to the extent of $10,000 per passenger could not pos-
sibly impose a burden on the industry.
As far as concerns non-scheduled fliers the insurance require-
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ment may deter certain operators from carrying passengers for com-
pensation. However, the committees felt that, as in the case of
ground damage, the operator who cannot afford to carry insurance
within the limitations specified in the act, ought not to be per-
mitted to carry passengers for hire. If he cannot pay the insurance
premium, he certainly could not respond in damages.
'Consideration was also given to the question whether limited
liability on the part of air carriers would discourage air travel.
The proposed act provides that an operator may establish a
schedule of higher liabilities dependent upon higher rates charged
the passenger. This permission given to the operator, will cer-
tainly enable him to offset any unfavorable reaction to statutory
limited liability. And from the standpoint of the passenger the
certainty of recovering a definite amount more than compensates for
the loss of the ability to recover an unlimited amount, if the pas-
senger or his relatives can accomplish the almost impossible task
of obtaining provable evidence of negligence on the part of the
operator.
III. As TO COLLISION
I shall pass over this subject by outlining in brief the provi-
sions of the proposed act.
The act provides that if a collision was due to the negligence
of only one of the aircraft involved, the operator of that aircraft
shall be liable to the other aircraft for whatever damages they
sustained.
On the other hand, if more than one operator was negligent,
the liabilities of the several negligent operators shall be propor-
tioned according to the degree of negligence of which they were
respectively guilty, if such degrees can be determined. Otherwise,
the damages must be borne equally. There are appropriate pro-
visions to the effect that each operator shall pay his own passenger
and ground damage liabilities in the first instance, but may subse-
quently recover from other operators involved in the collision the
amounts paid or payable on account of passenger and ground dam-
age liability.
IV. LAWFULNESS OF FLIGHT
The proposed Uniform Law of Airflight deals with this sub-
ject.
I have already stated the manner in which the 1922 Uniform
Aeronautics Act and the American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Torts, respectively, deal with this subject.
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The committees felt that neither the common law nor the Uni-
form Aeronautics Act is satisfactory.
Section 2 of the proposed Uniform Law of Airflight is as
follows:
"Section 2. [Lawfulness of Flight.] Flight of aircraft in this State is
lawful:
"(a) If the operator of the aircraft holds a valid certificate of air-
worthiness from the [State Aeronautics Commission], or the proper agency
of the Government of the United States and the aircraft is being navigated
by a pilot holding a valid certificate of competency issued by the [State
Aeronautics Commission] or the proper agency of the Government of the
United States; and
"(b) If at a height permitted by the rules, regulations or orders adopted
and promulgated by the [State Aeronautics Commission], and the applicable
rules of the proper agency of the Government of the United States; and
"(c) Unless so conducted as to involve a substantial risk of harm to
individuals or property on the land; or
"(d) Unless so conducted as to constitute a substantial interference
with the then existing use and enjoyment of the land or structures on the
land or space over the land or adversely affect the then existing value of the
land and structures thereon."
As this Section is phrased the operator of an aircraft has a
very insignificant burden to meet in order to establish that his
flight over the land of another is lawful. He must show that he
holds a valid certificate of airworthiness, that the aircraft is being
navigated by a pilot holding a valid certificate of competency, and
that the flight is at a height permitted by the rules, regulations or
orders adopted and promulgated by the appropriate state agency
and the applicable rules of the proper Federal agency.
When the operator proves these facts,-all of which are pecu-
liarly within his ability to prove,-the burden of proof shifts.
His flight is lawful unless the property owner proves certain
specified facts.
To negative the legality of flight, the land owner must show
that the flight is being so conducted as to involve a substantial risk
of harm to individuals or property on the land, or is being so con-
ducted as to constitute a substantial interference with the then ex-
isting use of the land or the structures thereon or the space over
the land, or so as adversely to affect the then existing (as distin-
guished from the speculative future) value of the land and the
structures thereon.
It was believed that by imposing on the land-owner the burden
of proving that the flight was substantially dangerous or substan-
tially interfering with the present use and enjoyment of the prop-
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erty or was adversely affecting the present value of the land and the
structures thereon, the operators of aircraft were being given full
consideration.
The committees recognized that it would be impossible from
a, practical standpoint to impose upon aircraft operators the burden
of negativing these various factors.
We did feel that it was not too much to require that the oper-
ators prove that their aircrafts and pilots have official sanction and
that they are flying at a lawful height.
It could not be' expected that in dealing with a subject so
complex any legislative proposal would meet with unanimous
approval.
As far as your organization is concerned, I call your attention
to the fact that these proposed acts do not in any way affect state
regulation of aviation or impose new duties upon state aviation
officials, with one single exception. It is provided that if an operator
wishes to do so he may furnish a bond or deposit cash in lieu of
insuring against the liabilities which the Liability Act ordinarily
requires the operator to insure against. In such cases the bond
must be filed or the cash deposited with the state aviation regu-
latory agency.
In all other respects the legislation would be administered
through the courts.
The proposed acts deal with a field of law in which uniformity
of state legislation is highly desirable.
The United States is party both to the Rome and Warsaw
Conventions, which relate to the liability of operators of aircraft
flying internationally.
The Rome Convention imposes the rule of absolute but limited
liability for ground damage. The Warsaw Convention dealing with
passenger liability, limits liability but does not impose it absolutely.
There are certain exceptions and conditions under which the carrier
can escape liability. The committees which prepared the proposed
uniform acts believed that it would tend to increase the volume of
air traffic if passengers by air were given the assurance that in the
event of their injury or death, recovery would be certain in an
amount determinable according to the rate which they paid.
The proposed Liability Act follows the trend of legislation in
other countries and of treaties between nations on this subject.
Personally I believe that its proposals are sound in principle
and will be beneficial both to the public and to -the aviation interests
of the country.
